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ABSTRACT
We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in
repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function
of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the
distribution of liquidity across banks, which is calculated over time using individual bank-
level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings. Banks pay more for liquidity
when positions are more imbalanced across banks, consistent with the existence of short
squeezing. We also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable
to squeezes. Healthier banks pay less but, contrary to what one might expect, banks in
formal liquidity networks do not. State guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not
protect against squeezes.
JEL classification: G12, G21, E43, E58, D44
Keywords: Banks, Liquidity, Money markets, Repos, Imbalance, Short squeezing, Finan-
cial health, Liquidity networks, State guarantees
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis has brought to light the importance of the market for liquidity
for the broader financial markets. For example, Secretary of the Treasury Henry M.
Paulson Jr. and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Ben Bernanke testified before the
US House Financial Services Committee on September 23, 2008, that the entire global
banking and financial system was put at risk as liquidity was drying up.1 If turmoil in the
market for liquidity can bring the global financial system to its knees, then it is important
to enhance our understanding of this market. In this paper, we contribute by studying at
a disaggregated level the prices that banks pay for liquidity, captured here by borrowing
rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap. Using
data from before the recent crisis, we show how market conditions and individual bank
characteristics impact on these prices.
Our primary focus is on the hypothesis that the distribution of liquidity across banks
matters (Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev, 2009) and, especially, on the idea that a more
imbalanced, or dispersed, distribution of liquidity leads to a tighter market in which banks
with liquidity shortfalls risk being squeezed or rationed by banks that are long (Nyborg
and Strebulaev, 2004).2 We find support for this idea. More generally, our findings show
that the price a bank pays for liquidity is affected by the liquidity positions of other banks,
as well as its own. This stands in contrast to a large swathe of asset pricing theory, in
which the distribution of an asset across agents is not a concern.
In our analysis of liquidity positions and imbalances, we control for bank-specific char-
acteristics; specifically, financial health, size, and type. These are also interesting to study
in their own right and give rise to four additional hypotheses that we test. First, finan-
cially unhealthy banks are likely to face tighter conditions in the interbank market, which
we expect to translate into higher prices. Second, there could be an advantage to size,
for example because larger banks are more diversified and thus could be less exposed to
1See, e.g., http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/09/23/bernanke-testimony-on-financial-markets-and-
government-bailout/.
2Related to this idea, Furfine (2000) finds evidence that a link exists between interbank payment flows
and the federal funds rate.
2
liquidity shocks (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002). They could also have better access to
interbank markets, through having larger networks of regular counterparties or possessing
a wider range of collateral. Scale also affects the incentives to put resources into liquidity
management. Larger banks have more to gain from a per unit reduction in the price of
liquidity. Allen, Peristiani, and Saunders (1989) provide empirical evidence of differences
in purchase behavior among differently sized banks in the federal funds market (see also
Furfine, 1999). In the euro area, Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002), Linzert, Nautz,
and Bindseil (2007), and Craig and Fecht (2007) present evidence suggesting that large
banks pay less, but they do not control for banks’ liquidity positions.
Third, bank type could matter, for example because different types of financial insti-
tutions have different relationship networks to help overcome frictions in the interbank
market (Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet, 2000). Empirical support for this idea is provided by
Furfine (1999) and Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2009). Ehrmann and Worms (2004) sug-
gest that formal liquidity networks, such as what we find among savings and cooperative
banks in Germany, can help banks overcome disadvantages from being small. Fourth and
finally, some bank types in our sample have governmental guarantees with respect to the
repayment of their loans, which we would expect to reduce credit risk and thus the price
these banks would have to pay for liquidity.
In practice, liquidity can be obtained through numerous types of contracts, varying in
the degree and type of collateralization, tenor, and type of counterparty. Our price data
come from repos with the central bank. Specifically, we study the prices, or rates, German
banks pay for liquidity in the main refinancing operations of the European Central Bank
(ECB). These are the most significant sources of liquidity in the euro area.3 During the
sample period, June 2000 to December 2001, the average operation injected 84 billion
euros of two-week money, against a broad set of collateral.4 Over the crisis period, other
3See, e.g., European Central Bank (2002a or 2002b) for further information. See Hartmann and
Valla (2008) for an overview of the euro money markets.
4Eligible collateral includes, but is not limited to, government bonds and covered bank bonds. See
European Central Bank (2001) for detailed information regarding the various types of collateral that
could be used in ECB main refinancing operations during the sample period.
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central banks such as the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England introduced
similar operations to allow banks to obtain liquidity against an expanded set of collateral.
Unique to this paper, we have data on banks’ reserve positions relative to what they are
required to hold with the central bank. Thus we can measure the extent to which banks
are short or long liquidity and thereby also get a gauge on money market imbalances.
Five other features of our data set make it ideal for studying variations in the prices
banks pay for liquidity. First, during the sample period, the ECB’s main refinancing oper-
ations are organized as discriminatory price auctions. Thus, different banks pay different
prices, as a function of their bids. Second, these operations are open to all credit institu-
tions in the euro area. Third, for each operation, we have all bids and allocations of all
institutions from the largest euro area country (Germany). Fourth, individual bank codes
allow us to control for bank-specific characteristics. Fifth, all liquidity obtained in the
operations have the same tenor (two weeks). Thus, because each operation provides us
with a comprehensive set of bids and prices for collateralized loans of identical maturity
at one time, we have a clean setting for studying the willingness to pay and the actual
prices paid for liquidity by different banks.
Our analysis has three key elements. First, for each bidder in each operation, we
calculate the quantity-weighted average rate bid and paid, respectively, benchmarked by
the contemporaneous two-week Eonia swap (the euro overnight index swap). Second, for
each bank, whether bidding or not, we also calculate its size-normalized liquidity position
at the time of each operation, based on the bank’s reserve requirements, reserve fulfillment,
and maturing repo from the operation two weeks back. Motivated by the theoretical results
of Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004), we then calculate the liquidity imbalance as the standard
deviation of the liquidity positions across all German banks. The theoretical prediction
is that bidding is more aggressive and prices are higher as imbalance increases because
of a larger potential for short squeezing. Third, we test this prediction by running panel
regressions with and without a Heckman sample selection correction, taking into account
individual banks’ liquidity positions and other characteristics.
The findings for the five hypotheses can be summarized as follows. First, consistent
with the theory, an increase in imbalance leads to more aggressive bidding and higher
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prices paid. Furthermore, the premium paid per unit that a bank is short is increasing
in imbalance. Second, banks pay more for liquidity as their financial health deteriorates.
Third, larger banks pay less. Furthermore, as imbalance increases, so does the extra cost
of liquidity to smaller banks. Thus, smaller banks seem to be more vulnerable to liquidity
squeezes.5 Fourth, institutions that are part of formal liquidity networks pay more than
other institutions, unless they also have government guarantees, in which case they pay
the same. Thus, formal liquidity networks do not work well for all member institutions.
Fifth, government guarantees reduce the price a bank pays for liquidity, on average, but
do not protect against squeezes.
To get a sense of magnitudes in this market, the average auction has a price differential
between the highest and lowest paying banks of 11.5 basis points (bps). On average, the
5% smallest banks pay in excess of 2 basis points more than the 1% largest banks. By
way of comparison, the average conditional volatility of the two-week interbank rate on
main refinancing operation days is 5.3 bps. One basis point of the average operation
size of 84 billion is equivalent to approximately 8.4 million euros on an annualized basis.
For the German bank with the largest (smallest) reserve requirement, 1 bp translates
into approximately 290,000 (20) euros on an annualized basis. Thus, for large banks, the
difference between paying the most or the least is a substantial sum, while for small banks
it is not (at least not individually).
Our findings potentially have wide implications. Insofar as conditions in the market
for liquidity are transmitted to the broader financial markets, tightening in the interbank
market arising from imbalances or worsening financial health could have systemic risk and
asset pricing relevance, perhaps along the lines modeled by Allen and Gale (1994, 2004) or
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005, 2009), and contribute toward commonality in liquid-
ity across different securities and asset classes (Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Roll, 2000;
Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001; and Chordia, Sarkar, and Sub-
rahmanyam, 2005). Support of this view is provided by Nyborg and O¨stberg (2010), who
5These results point to a potential source of competitive advantage of size in banking and thus relate to
the banking literature on the advantages and disadvantages of size. See, e.g., Peek and Rosengren (1998),
Berger and Udell (2002), Sapienza (2002), and Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005).
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find that tight interbank markets are associated with systematic stock market volume and
price effects.
The possibility of being squeezed or rationed could reduce banks’ propensity to extend
credit and thereby adversely affect the real economy. Evidence exists that the recent
turmoil led to reduced lending by banks to corporations (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010)
and retail borrowers (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen, 2010), which in the latter work is shown
to be particularly due to a reduction in lending by liquidity-strapped banks. Acharya,
Gromb and Yorulmazer (2009) argue that squeezed banks could also have to liquidate
existing loans, which could be inefficient.6
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional back-
ground on reserve requirements and the main refinancing operations. It also describes our
data sets. Section 3 defines bank-level variables, including liquidity status, and presents
some descriptive statistics. Section 4 studies the data cross-sectionally. Section 5 presents
the panel analysis and provides the main results of the paper. Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix contains an overview of the structure of the German banking sector.
2. Reserve requirements, repo auctions, and data
In this section, we describe the institutional setting and the data that we use for our
analysis.
2.1. Reserve requirements and repo auctions
According to ESCB (European System of Central Banks) regulation, all euro area
credit institutions, including subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks, are subject to a
minimum reserve requirement. The required reserves have to be held as average end-of-
6Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer argue that such inefficient liquidations provide a rationale for the
public provision of liquidity by a central bank. Related to this, Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) argue
that banks have a propensity to underinvest ex ante in liquid assets because they prefer others to bear
that cost. See also Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Donaldson (1992), Bhattacharya and
Fulghieri (1994), and Allen and Gale (2000).
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business-day balances over the maintenance period on account with the national central
bank.7 During the sample period of this paper, reserve maintenance periods had a length
of one month, starting on the 24th of each month and ending on the following 23rd, and
German banks accounted for around 30% of total reserve requirements in the euro zone.
The basis for the calculation of a bank’s reserve requirement is its end-of-calendar-
month short-term liabilities held by nonbanks or banks outside the euro area two months
before the beginning of the current maintenance period.8 For example, a bank’s reserve
requirements for the maintenance period starting May 24 are determined by its short-
term liabilities on March 31. The minimum reserve requirement is 2% of these liabilities.
Compliance with reserve requirements is a hard constraint. Unlike in the US, these cannot
be rolled over into the next maintenance period.9 Hence, once we have arrived at a given
maintenance period, reserve requirements are fixed. They can be viewed as exogenous for
the purpose of analyzing operations in that maintenance period.
The main source of reserves are the ECB’s main refinancing operations (or repo auc-
tions). These are held once a week. Thus there are up to five operations within each
reserve maintenance period. The funds obtained in these operations have a tenor of two
7Required reserve holdings are remunerated at the average stop-out rate of the ECB main refinancing
operations, during the respective maintenance period. Excess reserves can be transferred to the deposit
facility, which is always 100 basis points below the operations’ minimum bid rate during the sample period.
The ECB also operates with a marginal lending facility, where banks can borrow against collateral at a
rate that is 100 basis points above the minimum bid rate in the auction during the sample period.
8Specifically, these are overnight deposits, deposits with an agreed maturity up to two years, deposits
redeemable at notice up to two years, and issued debt securities with agreed maturity up to two years.
9If a bank fails to hold sufficient reserves, for example, because it does not make up a reserve shortfall at
the marginal lending facility, the ECB can impose any of the following sanctions. It can require payment
of up to 5 percentage points above the marginal lending rate or up to two times the marginal lending rate
on the difference between the required and the actually held reserves. Furthermore, the ECB can call for
the provision of non-interest-bearing deposits up to three times the amount the respective bank failed to
provide for. The maturity of those deposits must not exceed the period during which the institution failed
to meet the reserve requirement. The ECB can impose additional sanctions if an institution repeatedly
fails to comply with the reserve requirement. For a more detailed description of the Eurosystem’s minimum
reserve system, see European Central Bank (2005).
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weeks during the sample period.10 Each operation is timed to coincide with the maturity
of funds obtained in the second-to-previous operation. The schedule of operations in a
given year is announced three months before the start of the year. Typically, the opera-
tions are scheduled for Tuesdays at 9:30 a.m., with terms being announced on Mondays
at 3:30 p.m. Results are announced on the auction day at 11:20 a.m. Winning bids are
settled the following business day. The operations are open to all banks in the European
Monetary Union that are subject to reserve requirements.
In each operation, or auction, each bidder can submit up to ten bids, which are rate-
quantity pairs for two-week money. The tick size is 1 basis point and the quantity multiple
is 100,000 euros. There are no noncompetitive bids. There is a preannounced minimum
bid rate. This rate is determined at the meetings of the ECB’s Governing Council, nor-
mally held on the first and third Thursday of each month during the sample period. The
minimum bid rate was changed six times during the sample period.11
The ECB has a liquidity neutral policy; that is, it aims to inject through its operations
the exact quantity of liquidity that banks need to satisfy reserve requirements in aggregate.
When it announces a main refinancing operation, the ECB also publishes an estimate of
liquidity needs for the entire euro area banking sector for the following week, thus providing
bidders with an unbiased estimate of the auction size. We refer to this liquidity neutral
amount as the expected auction size. Deviations could occur because of the lag between
the auction announcements (Mondays at 3:30 p.m.) and the allotment decision (Tuesdays
at 11:20 a.m.), during which time the ECB could have updated its forecast of the banking
sector’s liquidity needs.12 However, deviations tend to be very small, averaging less than
10Once a month, the ECB also holds longer-term refinancing operations with three-month maturities
(see Linzert, Nautz, and Bindseil, 2007). The ECB could also hold nonregular, fine-tuning operations
with nonstandard maturities, for example, overnight, but none occurred during the sample period.
11It started out at 4.25%, changed to 4.5% in time for the September 5, 2000 auction, then increased to
4.75% in time for the October 11, 2000 auction, fell back to 4.50% for the auctions held on and after May
14, 2001, fell further to 4.25% for the auction on and after September 4, 2001, to 3.75% on September 18,
2001 and to 3.25% on November 13, 2001, at which level it remained until the end of the sample period.
12Deviations from the expected auction size also occur in a few instances in which banks in aggregate
demanded less than the liquidity neutral amount, speculating on decreases in the minimum bid rate in
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1% of the preannounced liquidity neutral amount. Thus, banks face little aggregate supply
uncertainty in the main refinancing operations. However, the liquidity neutral policy also
means that if one bank is long liquidity, another must be short. Thus this policy could
increase the potential for banks being able to exercise market power over marginal units.
2.2. Data
Our analysis makes use of four data sources supplied by the Bundesbank. First, we
have the complete set of bids made by German registered financial institutions, broken
down by bidder, in all 78 ECB repo auctions (main refinancing operations) in the period
June 27, 2000 to December 18, 2001. This covers 18 reserve maintenance periods. The
number of German bidders in an auction varies from 122 to 546.
Second, we have reserve data from all 2,520 German registered financial institutions in
the period May 2000 to December 2001 that were required to hold reserves with the central
bank as of December 2001. The reserve data cover 842 bidders in the main refinancing
operations and 1,678 nonbidders. A bidder is defined as a bank that bids at least once and
therefore appears in the auction data set. The reserve data consist of each institution’s
cumulative reserve holdings within the maintenance period, as well as its marginal reserve
holding, at the end of each business day preceding an auction. In addition, we have each
institution’s reserve requirement for each maintenance period over the sample period. The
reserve data are not available for 518 institutions that ceased operating as stand-alone
entities during the sample period. Seventeen of these submitted bids in the auctions.
Third, we have end-of-month balance sheet data for each bank. German banks are
required to report balance sheet statistics to the Bundesbank on a monthly basis. As a
measure of size, we thus use the book value of a bank’s total assets at the end of each
calendar month.
Fourth, we have yearly income statements, from which we obtain write-offs and provi-
sions and return on assets for each bank. The third financial health variable, the equity
ratio, is calculated from the balance sheet data on a monthly basis.
time for the next auction in the maintenance period.
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Unique bank codes allow us to track banks over time and correlate bidding decisions
with characteristics such as size, financial health, and fulfillment of reserves. The complete
bidding data consist of 59,644 individual bids and 25,345 individual demand schedules from
859 bidders. Deleting the bids from the 17 bidding banks for which we do not have reserve
data reduces this to 59,156 individual bids and 25,120 individual demand schedules from
842 different bidders. We lack balance sheet data on seven bidders, taking the number of
bidders for which we have complete data down to 835.
The data set is pruned further as follows. First, we exclude 45 banks that are registered
with zero reserve requirement in every maintenance period during the sample period.
Second, we throw out two extreme outliers. The first is a nonbidder that has an average
reserve fulfillment (relative to required reserves) of 190,926%. The second is a bidder with
an average reserve fulfillment of 3,011%. Without this bank, the average fulfillment of
private bidding banks is 100.25%; with this bank, the average is 131.8%. This takes the
data set down to 834 bidders and 1,632 nonbidders. Third, we exclude Bausparkassen and
special purpose banks (14 institutions).13 The analysis below is thus carried out on a final
set of 820 bidders (and 23,673 individual demand schedules) and 1,632 nonbidders.
3. Univariate analysis of bank-level variables
We start our analysis by studying bank-level variables with respect to liquidity status,
financial health, and size as well as pricing and bidding. To calculate money market
imbalance, we first need to measure individual banks’ liquidity status. Summary statistics
are presented by bank type, because savings banks and cooperatives are part of formal
liquidity networks and also have different ownership structures than private banks (see
the Appendix for details). Within each bank category, we differentiate between bidders
(banks that bid in at least one operation in our data set) and nonbidders to get a first
13These institutions have very low reserve requirements, averaging to around 0.1% of total assets. This
is substantially lower than for other banking sectors, reflecting that they have different functions than
typical banks. The Bausparkassen sector also includes several extreme outliers with respect to reserve
fulfillment.
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look at the extent to which liquidity status matters, here with respect to the decision to
participate in the main refinancing operations.
3.1. Liquidity status and financial health: definitions
To measure banks’ liquidity status, we define the variables fulfillment and normalized
net excess reserves. These are different ways of gauging the extent to which a bank is
short or long reserves going into an auction.
Fulfillment is a bank’s cumulative reserve holdings as a percentage of its cumulative
required reserves, within a reserve maintenance period.
fulfillmentijp =
cumulative holdingijp
cumulative required reservesijp
× 100, (1)
where i refers to the bank; j, to the auction; and p, to the reserve maintenance period.
Multiplying by 100 means that we express fulfillment as a percentage. The fulfillment is
measured for each bank using reserve data at the close of business the day before each
auction. A fulfillment of 100% means that the bank has held reserves thus far in the
maintenance period with a daily average exactly equal to the average daily requirement
the bank faces this period. Thus, a fulfillment of less (more) than 100% indicates that the
bank is short (long).
To define normalized net excess reserves, we start with the gross excess reserves. This
compares the reserves the bank has on deposit with the central bank the evening before
the auction with what it needs to hold on a daily basis for the balance of the reserve
maintenance period to exactly fulfill reserve requirements.
gross excess reservesijp = holdingijp − required remaining daily holdingijp, (2)
where
required remaining daily holdingijp
=
required total monthly reserves
ip
− cumulative holding
ijp
days left of maintenance period
jp
.
(3)
The net excess reserves nets out from a bank’s holding the loan from two auctions ago
that matures at the time of the current auction.
net excess reservesijp = gross excess reservesijp −maturing repoijp, (4)
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where maturing repoijp is the amount the bidder won in auction j−2. Because this amount
matures at the time of auction j, the net excess reserves is what the bank needs to borrow
in the auction to be even with respect to its reserve requirements. A negative (positive)
net excess reserves is indicative of the bank being short (long).
We normalize the net excess reserves for size by dividing it by the average daily required
holding:
normalized net excess reservesijp =
net excess reservesijp
average daily required reservesip
× 100. (5)
In a similar way, we also define the normalized gross excess reserves by dividing the gross
excess reserves by the average daily required reserves.
The normalized net excess reserves measure takes into account not only a bank’s ful-
fillment thus far in the maintenance period, but also its liquidity need going forward,
including the need to refinance maturing repos. For this reason, this measure is arguably
a better indicator of liquidity need than fulfillment, and we, therefore, use it in the regres-
sion analysis. Normalization by required reserves means that the measure is independent
of size, allowing us to distinguish between size and pure liquidity status effects. A bank
that always has a fulfillment of 100% and borrows in every auction (borrows in no auction)
has negative (zero) normalized net excess reserves going into every auction.
We capture a bank’s financial health by three variables: (1) write-offs and provisions,
measured annually as the write-offs and provisions on loans and securities as a percent of
total assets; (2) return on assets (ROA), measured annually as net income as a percent of
total assets; and (3) equity ratio, measured monthly as total book equity as a percent of
total assets.
3.2. Liquidity status and other bank characteristics: descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics on bidding banks’ liquidity status and other charac-
teristics, broken down into six bank categories: private banks, savings banks, cooperatives,
branches of foreign banks, Landesbanks (savings bank head institutions), and cooperative
central banks (see the Appendix for details). Table 2 does the same for nonbidding banks,
but note that there are no nonbidding Landesbanks or cooperative central banks.
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Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
Comparing these two tables reveals that the average bidder differs substantially on two
key dimensions from the average nonbidder. First, category by category, bidders are larger
than nonbidders by both asset size and reserve requirements. For example, for bidding
private banks these measures average to (in euros) 22,794 million (asset size) and 132.43
million (average daily reserve requirement). The corresponding numbers for nonbidders
are 1,478 million and 6.99 million.
Second, bidders are shorter liquidity than nonbidders. For bidders, the average nor-
malized net excess reserves is negative for all bank categories; for nonbidders it is positive.
So, by this measure, bidders are short going into the auctions, while nonbidders are long.
For example, for private banks, the average normalized net excess reserves is -243.82%,
with a median of -83.39%. For nonbidders, the mean and median are 210.83% and 24.93%,
respectively. The average fulfillment is also smaller for bidders than it is for nonbidders.
Thus, nonbidders are comparatively small and long, while bidders are comparatively large
and short.
With respect to the financial health variables, things are less clear-cut. For all bank
types, nonbidders have larger mean and median ROA than bidders. So, by this measure,
nonbidders can be said to be financially more healthy. However, across the different bank
types, there are both positive and negative differences between bidders and nonbidders
with respect to mean and median write-offs and provisions. The same holds true for the
equity ratio. For private banks that bid in at least one auction, the mean (median) write-
offs and provisions, ROA, and equity ratio are 0.35% (0.21%), 0.34% (0.21%), and 4.96%
(4.06%), respectively. The corresponding numbers for nonbidders are 0.73% (0.31%),
0.89% (0.25%), and 13.8% (8.58%).
The tables also show significant differences across bank categories. In Table 1 (bid-
ders), Landesbanks and cooperative central banks are substantially larger than the other
categories, including the private banks. Mean asset values are (in euros) 96,918 million for
Landesbanks and 60,320 million for cooperative central banks, as compared with 22,794
million for private banks, 2,092 million for savings banks, 678 million for cooperatives, and
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2,256 million for branches of foreign banks. So, on average by asset value, Landesbanks
and cooperative central banks are up to 4.5 times larger than private banks. At the same
time, private banks are approximately ten times larger than savings and foreign banks,
which in turn are approximately three times as large as cooperatives. The smallest asset
value in the sample is 26 million (a cooperative), and the largest value is 267,591 million
(a domestic private bank).
Differences also are apparent in liquidity status among bidding banks. For example,
private domestic banks have a mean fulfillment of 100.25%. Savings banks and cooperatives
have similar mean fulfillments, 102.65% and 102.94%, respectively. The mean fulfillment
across foreign institutions is 142.30%. Landesbanks have the lowest fulfillment, 82.44%,
and cooperative central banks have a fulfillment of 99.00%. So, on average, as measured by
fulfillment, German private banks, savings banks, and cooperatives are slightly long, and
cooperative central banks and, in particular, Landesbanks are short going into the auctions.
However, taking into account maturing repos, all categories of banks are on average short
going into the auctions, as seen by the negative mean and median normalized net excess
reserves. There is substantial variation across individual banks. The normalized net excess
reserves varies from −3, 739.82% (a private bank) to 968.01% (a foreign bank).
3.3. Pricing and bidding measures and statistics
Table 3 reports on various pricing and bidding variables, by bank type. The table
draws on all banks that bid at least once. For each bank, we measure the relevant variables
first for each individual demand schedule (i.e., across the bidders’ set of bids in a given
auction). Then we average across demand schedules for each bank to obtain a population
of bank-level observations, whose summary statistics are reported in the table.
Insert Table 3 about here
To benchmark bids and rates paid in the main refinancing operations, we use the two-
week Eonia swap rate taken as the midpoint of the bid and ask from Reuters quotations
at 9:15 a.m. on the auction day. Our pricing variables are
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Underpricing: a measure of the price paid by bidders relative to the contemporaneous
swap rate. It equals the swap rate less the bidder’s quantity-weighted average winning
bids. We borrow from the IPO (initial public offerings) and auction literatures and call
this spread underpricing because the rate paid is typically below the contemporaneous
swap rate (midpoint of the bid and ask).
Relative underpricing: a bidder’s underpricing in a given auction less the average un-
derpricing in that auction across bidders (in the sample).
Discount: a measure of the willingness to pay. It equals the swap rate less the bidder’s
quantity-weighted average bid rate.14
Relative discount: a bidder’s discount in a given auction less the average discount in
that auction across bidders.
The price of liquidity can be said to be higher the lower is the underpricing or the
relative underpricing. In addition to the pricing variables, we report on a number of
bidding variables, which help provide a fuller picture of banks’ bidding decisions.
Stop-out deviation: the quantity-weighted standard deviation of bids around the stop-
out rate.15 This is a measure of how well a bank predicts the stop-out rate and, therefore,
affects what it pays for liquidity. A small stop-out spread tends to result in a relatively
large underpricing.
Award ratio: a bidder’s award in an auction as a percentage of his demand.
Award to total award: a bidder’s award in an auction as a percentage of aggregate
award in that auction to financial institutions registered in Germany.
Bidding frequency: percentage of auctions a bank participates in.16
Number of bids: the number of interest rate–quantity pairs.
Substantial differences exist across bank categories in the prices paid for liquidity,
as captured by underpricing and relative underpricing. Private banks have an average
underpricing and relative underpricing of 1.24 bps and 0.07 bps, respectively. For savings
14We call this quantity discount because the rate bid is typically below the contemporaneous swap rate
(midpoint of the bid and ask).
15The stop-out, or marginal, rate is the rate of the lowest winning bid.
16This means that, unlike the other variables, bidding frequency is not an average across a bank’s
demand schedules in different auctions.
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banks, the corresponding numbers are 1.66 bps and −0.01 bps; for cooperatives, they
are 0.78 bps and −0.87 bps; for foreign banks, they are 0.69 bps and −0.18 bps; for
Landesbanks, they are 1.48 bps and 0.53 bps, and for cooperative central banks, they
are 2.82 bps and 0.51 bps. Thus Landesbanks are the best performers, having a relative
underpricing that is 1.40 bps higher than cooperatives, which are the worst performers.
The Landesbanks are closely followed by the cooperative central banks.17
We see very similar results when we analyze the willingness to pay for liquidity across
different bank categories, as captured by discount and relative discount. Private banks
have an average discount and relative discount of 3.04 bps and 0.14 bps, respectively. For
savings banks, the corresponding numbers are 3.32 bps and −0.09 bps; for cooperatives,
they are 3.47 bps and −0.18 bps; for foreign banks, they are 2.84 bps and −0.15 bps; for
Landesbanks, they are 2.83 bps and 0.50 bps; and for cooperative central banks, they are
4.27 bps and 0.45 bps. Thus Landesbanks and cooperative central banks, followed by the
private banks, are willing to pay less for liquidity than the rest of the banks.
The stop-out deviation captures a banks’ ability to correctly predict the stop-out rate
in a given auction. It is lowest for the Landesbanks (1.04 bps) and cooperative central
banks (1.17 bps) and highest for the cooperatives (2.80 bps). This could contribute to
the larger relative underpricing we observe for the Landesbanks and cooperative central
banks.
The award ratio measures the relative aggressiveness of a bidder. A ratio of 100% in
a given auction means that all of a bidder’s bids won, i.e., all his bids were above the
stop-out rate. Thus, the bidder can be said to have been highly aggressive relative to
other bidders. An award ratio of zero is indicative of very cautious bidding. Cooperative
central banks have the lowest average award ratio, 42.34%, followed by the Landesbanks
17A caveat with respect to using the raw underpricing number, instead of the relative underpricing, to
gauge what banks pay relative to each other is that the raw underpricing measure gives more weight to the
early auctions in the sample period, because these auctions had a higher participation rate [see Nyborg,
Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002) for a discussion of the decreasing time trend in the number of bidders].
Because interbank rates were higher around these auctions, the underpricing in these auctions was higher
than in later auctions.
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with 48.54%. Across the other bank categories, the range is from 54.90% for private banks
to 58.97% for cooperatives.
The average award to total award varies from 0.03% (cooperatives), 0.09% (savings),
0.17% (foreign), 0.63% (private), 1.45% (cooperative central banks), and 1.68% (Landes-
banks). The maximum is 11.58% (a private domestic bank). These numbers illustrate
how small any bank in this market is compared with the market size.
Landesbanks participate more frequently than other banks. Specifically, they bid on
average in 80.45% of the 78 auctions. Cooperative bidders participate in the fewest number
of auctions, only 27.51%. As seen by comparing Tables 1 and 2, the cooperative sector also
has the smallest participation rate, as measured by the percentage of banks in the sector
that bid at least once. The average number of bids per demand schedule varies from 1.87
(foreign banks) to 3.51 (cooperative central banks).
4. Cross-sectional regressions
In this section, we take a preliminary look at the extent to which the bank character-
istics discussed above affect the prices banks pay for liquidity by running cross-sectional
regressions. This analysis is refined in Section 5, where we take advantage of the panel
structure of the data, which allows us to incorporate into the analysis money market im-
balance and banks’ liquidity status at the time of each operation. The cross-sectional
regressions in the current section are arguably most relevant for features that are perma-
nent or relatively time invariant, such as bank type and size.
For each bidding bank, we consider the following dependent variables, as averages
across the auctions in which the bank participated or won some units: underpricing, rel-
ative underpricing, discount, relative discount, stop-out deviation, and award ratio.18 As
independent variables, we employ for each bank the natural log of the bank’s assets, the
net normalized excess reserves, write-offs and provisions, return on assets, and equity ra-
tio, all as averages over the sample period. We also include bank sector dummy variables
18Underpricing and relative underpricing can be calculated only conditional on winning. The other
dependent variables are calculated conditional on bidding.
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for savings, cooperatives, foreign banks, Landesbanks, and cooperative central banks, thus
taking private domestic banks as the benchmark. Finally, to examine whether small banks
are especially sensitive to being short, for example due to being more vulnerable to pre-
dation along the lines of Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007), we include an interaction
variable, small×nex, where small is a dummy variable that takes one if the bank has av-
erage assets of less than 100 million euros over the sample period and zero otherwise. The
expression nex is shorthand for the normalized net excess reserves. Standard errors are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity by using the Huber-White estimate of variance.
Results are reported in Table 4. The price of liquidity decreases in bank size. The
coefficient on ln(assets) in the relative underpricing regression is 0.186 and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. In other words, an increase in size (in millions) by a factor of e
leads to a 0.186 bps increase in relative underpricing. In the (plain) underpricing regression,
the coefficient is 0.149. The smaller underpricing of larger banks can be explained by two
factors: (1) They bid at lower rates. The regression coefficient on ln(assets) in the discount
regression, for example, is -0.201 (significant at the 10% level). (2) Larger banks cluster
their bids closer around the stop-out rate. The regression coefficient on ln(size) in the stop-
out deviation regression is -0.320 (significant at the 1% level). Thus, larger banks tend to
win with lower bids than smaller banks. These results can also be seen from simple sorts
on size. For example, the 5% and 6–10% smallest banks have an average underpricing of
-1.33 bps and -0.39 bps; whereas banks in the 98th and 99th size percentiles have average
underpricings of -0.80 bps and 0.76 bps.19
Insert Table 4 about here
With respect to bank type, the most notable result is that cooperative banks have a
lower relative underpricing than other banks. They pay a significant 0.395 bps more for
liquidity than private banks.
19The average size of banks in these groups is 71.22, 130.6, 23,995.47, and 105,928.50 (in millions
of euros) for the 0–5th, 6–10th, 98th, and 99th percentile respectively. Details and further results on
size-sorted groups are available in an earlier version of this paper.
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The regression coefficients on the normalized net excess reserves and the small×nex
interaction variable suggest only a weak relation between a bank’s typical liquidity position
and the underpricing and discount variables. Moreover, for the normalized net excess
reserves, the sign in one of the four pricing regressions is negative, not positive, as one
would expect from a short squeezing line of argument. However, cross-sectional regressions
are not the appropriate way to examine the effect of liquidity positions, because these
change from auction to auction.
With the exception of the equity ratio, the financial health variables are statistically
insignificant in all regressions. Surprisingly, an increase in the equity ratio is associated
with a significantly higher willingness to pay for liquidity, as seen from its coefficients
of -0.178 and -0.114 in the discount and relative discount regressions, respectively. The
coefficients in the two underpricing regressions are negative, too, but only (marginally)
significant in one of them. However, these regressions also ignore time variation in the
equity ratio as well as operation-specific market conditions.
5. Panel regressions
In this section, we make full use of the panel structure of the data. We start by running
plain panel regressions on the sample of bidding banks to test the hypotheses described in
the Introduction. We are particularly interested in seeing whether an increase in money
market imbalances leads to more aggressive bidding and whether this is especially so for
banks that are smaller and have larger short positions. We examine the robustness of our
findings by running Heckman selection regressions to take into account a bank’s decision
to participate in a given auction, using bidding as well as nonbidding banks.
5.1. Imbalance and other explanatory variables
We use our reserve position data to calculate a measure of imbalance in the market.
In particular, for each operation, we define imbalance to be the standard deviation of
the normalized net excess reserves across all banks, bidders and nonbidders alike. The
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purpose of including this variable in our regressions is to examine the hypothesis that
liquidity is more expensive when there is a greater imbalance in liquidity positions across
banks. For each bank, we interact imbalance with the normalized net excess reserves (nex),
to examine the extent to which more short banks could be more vulnerable to a greater
imbalance in the market. Under the hypothesis that short squeezing is an issue, Nyborg
and Strebulaev (2004) show that a more extreme dispersion of holdings across banks leads
to more aggressive bidding by shorts that are subject to the possibility of being squeezed
as well as by banks that have sufficient market power to implement a squeeze. Given the
importance of bank size, shown in Section 4, we also interact imbalance with ln(assets)
to examine the extent to which smaller banks could have a further disadvantage in more
imbalanced markets.
The full set of explanatory variables can be divided into five categories. First, we have
the (more or less) permanent basic bank characteristics, ln(assets) and bank type. Sec-
ond, we have liquidity condition variables, which include a temporary bank characteristic,
normalized net excess reserves; a market condition, imbalance; and three interaction vari-
ables, small×nex, imbalance×nex, and imbalance×ln(assets).20 Third, we have the bank
characteristics that relate to financial health; write-offs and provisions, return on assets,
and equity ratio. Fourth, we have auction-specific market conditions; expected auction
size and the size ratio. Fifth, we have interbank rate variables; the swap spread, the neg-
ative swap spread, and the conditional volatility of the two-week Eonia swap rate. The
variables that are not already discussed above are
Size ratio: Under the hypothesis that positions matter and that short squeezing could
be a concern, we would expect that the price of liquidity is larger when the operation offers
a poor opportunity for refinancing maturing loans from the operations two weeks ago. To
examine this, we define the size ratio to be the expected size of the current operation
as a percentage of the size of the operation two weeks ago and which now needs to be
refinanced.
Interbank rate variables: These are included as control variables.21 Swap spread is the
20Nex is the normalized net excess reserves.
21Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002), who first examined their impact, find they were significant
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two-week Eonia swap rate at 9:15 a.m. on operation days less the minimum bid rate in
the auction. Because bidders cannot submit bids below the minimum bid rate, the swap
spread puts an upper bound on a bidder’s underpricing and discount. The conditional
volatility of the two-week Eonia swap rate on operation days is calculated using a modified
GARCH(1,1) model (Bollerslev, 1986), based on daily observations at 9:15 a.m. in the
period January 4, 1999 to December 20, 2001.22 The negative swap spread is a dummy
variable that is one if the swap rate is below the minimum bid rate and zero otherwise.
Summary statistics for the market condition variables, including the two market condi-
tion interaction variables, are in Table 5. Imbalance has a mean of 1,144% and a standard
deviation of 3,331%. It is highly skewed. The minimum is 86%, the median is 400%,
and the maximum is 26,997%. Imbalance×nex has a mean of -208,065%2 and a standard
deviation of approximately (minus) thirteen times that. Imbalance×ln(assets) has a mean
of 7,543 and a standard deviation of around three times that. The size ratio averages to
1.24 and has a standard deviation of 1.75. Its minimum is 0.2 and its maximum is 15.8,
illustrating that there is a substantial range in this measure. There is substantially larger
scope to refinance a repo when the current auction is 15.8 times larger than the previous
one as compared with when the size ratio is merely 0.2. The expected auction size has an
average of 84.26 billion euros, with a standard deviation of 28.83 billion. On auction days,
the swap spread has an average of 5.91 bps, with a standard deviation of 8.66 bps. The
volatility of the swap rate has an average of 5.32 bps on auction days, with a standard
deviation of 1.33 bps.
Insert Table 5 about here
and that the swap spread in particular contributes to a high R2. Our findings with respect to these
variables are similar.
22We have considered various calendar effects, as in Hamilton (1996). The final specification is along
the lines of that in Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002). For details, contact us or see earlier working
paper versions of this paper.
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5.2. Plain panel regressions
In this subsection, we run panel regressions of underpricing, relative underpricing, dis-
count, relative discount, stop-out deviation, and award ratio on the explanatory variables
discussed above. The liquidity status, auction-specific market conditions, and interbank
rate variables are available for each individual operation. ln(assets) and the equity ratio
are available monthly. In the regressions, for each operation we use the values of these two
variables at the end of the month prior to the start of the maintenance period that the
operation falls under. Write-offs and provisions and return on assets are measured at the
end of the year before the respective operation. To allow for variations in conditions in dif-
ferent maintenance periods, the regressions are run with maintenance period fixed effects.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity by using the Huber-White estimate of
variance and are clustered on the auctions.23
Table 6 reports the results. Each column represents a different regression, and we
discuss each in turn. The underpricing regression confirms our earlier results that large
banks pay less for liquidity. The coefficient on ln(size) in the underpricing regression is a
statistically significant (at the 1% level) 0.174.
Insert Table 6 about here
With respect to the liquidity status variables, the coefficient on the normalized net ex-
cess reserves is statistically insignificant in both the underpricing and relative underpricing
regressions. However, when we separate out small banks, we do get a significant effect. In
both cases, the coefficient on small×nex is significantly positive, albeit small. Thus, for
small banks, the shorter their positions, the lower is their underpricing; i.e., the higher
is the price they pay for liquidity. It appears that it is especially small banks that suffer
from being short.
The results relating to the distribution of liquidity positions across banks are stronger.
The coefficients on imbalance in the underpricing regressions are negative and statistically
significant, meaning that the price of liquidity in repos with the central bank relative to the
23Running panel estimations with standard errors clustered on banks, we obtain similar results.
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contemporaneous swap rate increases when there is greater imbalance in liquidity positions
across banks. The effect is small, but so are the magnitudes we are dealing with in this
market. A one standard deviation increase in imbalance leads to a decrease in underpricing
of approximately 0.033 bps. The coefficient on the interaction variable imbalance×nex is
positive and statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in this variable
has a 0.002 bps effect on underpricing. Thus, as imbalance increases, banks pay more for
liquidity the shorter their positions are. The interaction variable imbalance×ln(assets) is
also positive and statistically significant. In this case, a one standard deviation increase in
the independent variable leads to an increase in underpricing of approximately 0.01 bps.
In other words, as imbalance increases, large banks suffer less than small banks, in terms
of the price they pay for liquidity. This is further support for the view that small banks
are more vulnerable to tightness in the interbank market.
Turning now to the operation-specific market condition variables, the coefficients on
the size ratio and the expected size are 0.098 and 0.022, respectively, both significant at
the 1% level. So, as the auction size grows, the price paid for liquidity falls. The positive
coefficient on expected size could reflect that increasingly expensive collateral has to be
used as the auction size grows. The positive size ratio coefficient reveals that the price of
liquidity gets relativelymore expensive when the scope for refinancing falls. This illustrates
that aggregate positions matter.
Worse financial health is associated with an increase in the price of liquidity. A 1
percentage point worsening in write-offs and provisions, the equity ratio, and the return
on assets leads to a decrease in underpricing of 17.258 bps, 0.025 bps, and 6.228 bps, re-
spectively. The coefficient on write-offs and provisions is large, especially given an average
underpricing of 0.74 to 1.94 bps and a standard deviation of write-offs and provisions of
0.12% to 0.60% depending on bank type.
Looking at the bank type dummies, we see that only the cooperatives have an under-
pricing that is statistically different from that of private banks. So the univariate results
that Landesbanks and cooperative head institutions pay less do not survive the multivari-
ate analysis. Controlling for all other factors, cooperatives pay 0.415 bps more for liquidity
than private banks.
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The relative underpricing regression is similar, except that most of the market con-
dition variables have lost or reduced statistical and economic significance, as one would
expect. The coefficient on imbalance and the two interaction variables are still statisti-
cally significant. The negative coefficient on imbalance means that the distribution of the
price paid for liquidity across banks in an operation is skewed toward higher rates. This
is consistent with the view that a larger imbalance leads to a larger chance of a liquidity
squeeze.
The discount and relative discount regressions are also in line with the underpricing
regression, but with some notable exceptions. First, paralleling the cross-sectional regres-
sions, ln(assets) is not significantly different from zero. Second, the normalized net excess
reserves is now significant at the 1% level. Specifically, in the plain discount regression
the coefficient is 2.3×10−4 , showing that the shorter a bank is the smaller is the discount.
This is equivalent to saying that a one standard deviation (for private banks) decrease
in the normalized net excess reserve leads to an increase in the relative discount by ap-
proximately 0.1 bps. Savings banks and branches of foreign banks have a lower discount,
and thus a higher willingness to pay, than private banks, yet they do not end up paying
more. A part of the explanation for this, at least for savings banks, is that they have a
significantly lower stop-out deviation.
The stop-out deviation measures how close to the stop-out rate banks submit their
bids. A low stop-out deviation tends to reduce the price paid for liquidity. A consistently
low stop-out deviation could be the result of ability or an informational advantage with
respect to where the market is. It could also arise for banks that are not concerned with
being squeezed or rationed in the interbank market, because such banks need not be so
aggressive in the auctions as banks that are concerned with these issues. Large banks could
have a lower stop-out deviation for both of these reasons. Our results also show that banks
with large write-offs and provisions or small equity ratios have larger stop-out deviations.
Coupled with the fact that write-offs and provisions do not affect discounts, this suggests
that less financially healthy banks use a strategy in which they try to counteract high
bids, placed to ensure success in the auction, with low bids, to try to reduce the overall
price paid. The end result is that they pay more. We also see that small short banks have
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larger stop-out deviations, but these banks also have smaller discounts.
The award ratio regression shows that this variable tends to increase in write-offs and
provisions, which is in line with the results that financially unhealthy banks are more
desperate to obtain funds from the central bank. An alternative but not wholly unrelated
interpretation is that these banks bid more aggressively because they are in possession
of collateral of especially low quality. Banks with larger short positions also bid more
aggressively, as measured by the award ratio. Again, this is in line with our other findings.
To summarize, the panel regressions show that liquidity positions affect the price paid
for liquidity and bid levels. But it is not just a bank’s own position that matters; it is
especially how liquidity is distributed across banks. The more imbalance there is, the more
are banks willing to pay and the more do they end up paying, especially the shorter and
smaller they are.24 Our results also show that financial health is important. Less healthy
banks bid more aggressively and pay more for liquidity than more healthy banks. The
panel analysis also confirms the finding from the cross-sectional regressions that banks
pay more for liquidity the smaller they are.
5.3. Panel regressions with Heckman correction
The estimation methodology in Subsection 5.2 does not consider a bank’s decision to
participate in an auction or not. If this decision is nonrandom, the estimated coefficients
would be inconsistent. In this subsection, we correct for the possibility of a selection bias
by using a Heckman selection model. This model combines a selection mechanism for
participating in the main refinancing operation with a regression model.
24While the evidence is thus consistent with short squeezing being a concern, from a theoretical per-
spective one could also contemplate the possibility that banks with excess liquidity could be squeezed,
because their alternative to trading in the market would be to use the deposit facility, which is 100 bp
below the minimum bid rate in the auctions. Reasons that it could be worse being short than long include
that a short bank needs eligible collateral to access the marginal lending facility and that, given the ECB’s
liquidity neutral policy, if some liquidity is taken out of the interbank market through inefficient liquidity
management at the individual bank level (e.g., due to a bank with a small amount of excess liquidity
not participating in the interbank market), the ECB’s liquidity neutral policy gives rise to a shortage of
liquidity in the interbank market.
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Indexing banks by i and operations by j, the selection equation is
z∗ij = γ
′wij + µij . (6)
The regression model is
yij = β
′xij + ij, (7)
where (µij , ij) are assumed to be bivariate normal [0, 0, 1, σ, ρ].
z∗ij is not observed; the variable is observed as zij = 1 if z
∗
ij > 0 and zero otherwise with
probabilities Prob(zij = 1) = Φ(γ
′wij) and Prob(zij = 0) = 1-Φ(γ
′wij). zi = 1 indicates that
the bank participates and Φ is the standardized normal cumulative distribution function.
In the selected sample,
E[yij|zij = 1] = β
′xij + ρσλ(γ
′wij), (8)
where λ is the inverse Mills ratio.
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood, which provides consistent, asymptot-
ically efficient parameter estimates (see Greene, 2000). Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity by using the Huber-White estimate of variance and are clustered at the
auction level.
The set of explanatory variables, x, in the regression model is the same as in the
panel regressions in subsection 5.2.25 In the selection equation, we use two additional
variables, namely, maturing repo indicator and last auction. The maturing repo indicator
is one if the bank won some units two operations ago, and last auction is the aggregate
underpricing in the previous main refinancing operation. We expect that a bank is more
likely to participate if it has to refinance (the maturing repo indicator is one). The results
are virtually the same with or without the variable last auction.
The Heckmanmodel is run on the full data set, including bidding banks and nonbidding
banks. Results are in Table 7. Panel A presents the regression model; Panel B the selection
model; and Panel C statistics on the parameters.
Insert Table 7 about here
25However, we now do not include maintenance period fixed effects.
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Comparing Panel A with the plain panel regression in Table 6, a few notable differences
are apparent. For the most part, the variables that were significant remain so, though
sometimes with altered p-levels, and the coefficients are very close to what they were before.
Few variables go from being insignificant to significant. The most notable exceptions
are as follows. First, ln(assets) goes from being insignificant in the plain panel relative
underpricing and award ratios regressions to being significantly positive and negative,
respectively. So larger banks bid at lower rates than smaller banks and are less aggressive
overall. This supports our other findings. Second, larger write-offs and provisions do not
lead to significantly larger award ratios after all. Third, imbalance×nex is not significant
in the relative discount regression. However, its coefficient is still significantly positive in
the two underpricing regressions. Fourth, the coefficient on imbalance×ln(assets) reverses
sign in the discount regression. With the Heckman correction, it is positive—just as in
the relative underpricing regression. In other words, as imbalance increases, larger banks
pay relatively less than smaller banks. In sum, overall, these changes serve to strengthen
our results.26 The conclusions from the previous subsection remain intact.
In Panel B the selection equation is very similar for the different independent variables.
This illustrates its robustness. Increased bank size is associated with a larger likelihood to
participate, as is being a savings bank. Cooperatives and foreign banks are less likely to
participate. With respect to liquidity status, a larger imbalance is associated with a larger
participation rate, consistent with the interpretation that this variable is associated with
squeezes. The more likely a squeeze is, the more important it is to participate to cover
one’s short position, or possibly being able to squeeze. An increase in return on assets is
associated with a decrease in the likelihood of bidding, perhaps because banks that are
generating larger earnings have less need to obtain liquidity from others. Loss of financial
health as measured by an increase in write-offs and provisions is surprisingly associated
with a fall in the probability of participating. This could reflect a lack of collateral. A bank
is more likely to participate when the size ratio is large. This is not surprising, because a
larger relative auction size is indicative of an increased need for liquidity in the banking
26The size ratio also behaves slightly differently with the Heckman correction.
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system. An increase in expected auction size is associated with an increased likelihood of
bidding. The positive coefficients on the maturing repo indicator and last auction confirm
that banks are more likely to participate if they have a refinancing need and also when
the previous auction was highly underpriced.
Panel C reports the different parameters for the Heckman estimation, i.e., ρ, σ, and
λ. The results suggest that these parameters are significant for each estimation except for
underpricing. In particular, the correlation of the residuals in the bidding and performance
model and the selection model, which is captured by ρ, is significant at the 5% level. This
suggests that it is important to use the Heckman approach to take into account the decision
whether to submit a bid for the analysis of how bidders submit their bids. Nevertheless, the
results from the Heckman panel regression are very similar as in the plain panel regression.
5.4. Liquidity networks and government guarantees
This subsection differentiates between the effects of liquidity networks and government
guarantees by focusing on differences in underpricing between cooperatives (which are part
of formal liquidity networks but have no government guarantees) and savings banks (which
are part of formal liquidity networks and had government guarantees during the sample
period). Tables 6 and 7 show that, ceteris paribus, the underpricing of savings banks is
the same as for private banks, while that of cooperatives is a statistically significant 0.4
bps lower. In other words, institutions that are part of formal liquidity networks pay more
than private banks (which are not), unless they also have government guarantees, in which
case they pay the same. This gives rise to the notion that these formal networks could
induce banks to free-ride on the efforts of other banks in the network, along the lines
of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987). An alternative view is that cooperatives and savings
banks that participate in the main refinancing operations do so because they experience
rationing within their respective networks. This could carry stigma, leading them to have
to pay more for liquidity in the market. In either case, the conclusion appears to be that
the networks do not function well for all members.
The government guarantees of savings banks should reduce credit risk associated with
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lending to these institutions, and thus their superior performance as compared with co-
operatives is not surprising. However, in theory these guarantees should not offer pro-
tection from short squeezing, because this is fundamentally about market power, not
credit risk. To test this and investigate in more detail the incremental benefits of govern-
ment guarantees, we rerun our Heckman panel regressions with five additional explanatory
variables, namely, each of the five bank-group dummies interacted with imbalance. The
coefficients and z-statistics (in brackets) of these five new variables in the underpricing
regression are: imbalance×savings, -3.7E-06 (-11.02); imbalance×cooperatives, -2.6E-06
(-6.42); imbalance×foreign, -3.2E-07 (-0.51); imbalance×Landesbanks, -2.7E-06 (-4.88);
and imbalance×cooperative central banks, -1.1E-04 (-1.82).27
The statistically significant negative coefficients show that both savings banks and
cooperatives react more strongly to increased imbalance than do private banks (which
constitute the benchmark group in the regression), as do their head institutions. Thus,
while savings banks typically pay the same as private banks with similar characteristics,
savings banks do worse as imbalance increases. Our conclusion is that while government
guarantees reduce credit risk, they do not help against short squeezes. Another way to
summarize our findings here is that short squeezing is sufficiently significant for some
savings banks that it wipes out the advantage they have from government guarantees.28
6. Concluding remarks
This paper shows that the price a bank pays for liquidity depends on its individual
liquidity position as well as the distribution of liquidity across banks. In particular, our
findings are consistent with the existence of periodically occurring liquidity squeezes or the
27Adding these five interaction variables does not cause notable changes to the coefficients or z-statistics
of the other explanatory variables relative to what is reported in Table 7. Therefore, for the sake of brevity,
we do not report the full regression results here.
28In July 2001, the European Commission and the German government decided to remove state guaran-
tees for savings banks and Landesbanks, to become effective in July 2005. We use the July 2001 event to
run a difference-in-difference analysis to compare the behavior by savings banks and Landesbanks before
and after the decision. We find no significant differences for any of the variables of interest.
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risk that such squeezes could materialize. Because the sample period of this paper is a time
of relative normalcy, this shows that liquidity squeezes are not just a crisis phenomenon.
The extent to which tightness in the market for liquidity is transmitted to the broader
financial markets and to the real economy, as perhaps suggested by the experience of the
recent crisis, is therefore an important issue for future research.
Our finding that the price paid for liquidity increases as a bank’s financial health
deteriorates complements recent findings by Acharya and Merrouche (2009) that, during
the recent crisis, tight interbank markets were in part caused by precautionary hoarding by
poorly performing banks. These results point to the existence of market discipline in the
market for liquidity and that system-wide tightness in the interbank market could result
from a general deterioration in banks’ financial health, not just because of a standard
Akerlof (1970) adverse selection problem, but also because banks start to take action so
as to not individually suffer the consequences of market discipline.
Our research can be broadened in several ways. An important question is whether
banks with poor collateral are more exposed to adverse liquidity conditions and, therefore,
bid higher and pay more for liquidity. Data on individual bank collateral holdings, however,
are very hard to obtain.
Another important issue is how the effects we have uncovered would play out during
a crisis period. For example, that small banks are more adversely affected by increases in
liquidity imbalances, ceteris paribus, suggests that small banks would be more vulnerable
in a crisis. However, because small banks tend to be less short than large banks, the net
effect of a crisis could be worse for large banks than small ones. Thus, while our findings
are consistent with the view that large banks have better access to the interbank market
for liquidity than smaller banks, it is not clear how they would fare if this market would
seize up.
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Table 1
Bank characteristics: bidders
Descriptive statistics on bank characteristic variables for six types of banks as classified by the Deutsche Bundesbank: private
banks, savings banks, cooperatives, branches of foreign banks, Landesbanks, and cooperative central banks. Bidders are all banks that
participated in at least one main refinancing operation during the sample period (June 27, 2000 to December 18, 2001). The liquidity
variables (fulfillment, normalized gross excess reserves, normalized net excess reserves) are calculated for each bank the day before each
auction. Asset size and the equity ratio are calculated for each bank each calendar month; reserve requirements for each maintenance
period. Write-offs and provisions and return on assets are obtained annually. See Subsection 3.2 for definitions of the variables. For
each bank, the mean of each variable is calculated (unconditionally, i.e., not conditional on bidding decisions), thus yielding a sample
of individual bank means for each variable. The table reports summary statistics of these means across banks within each bank type.
Mean Median Standard Standard Minimum Maximum Observations
deviation error
Panel A: Private banks
Assets (millions) 22,794 4,149 52,774 5,472 62 267,591 93
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 132.43 20.25 438.16 45.44 0.20 2,901.60 93
Fulfillment (percent) 100.25 101.81 15.53 1.61 50.85 157.03 93
Norm gross excess reserves (percent) 14.55 9.42 41.83 4.34 -77.78 244.37 93
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -243.82 -83.39 530.25 54.98 -3,739.82 212.39 93
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.35 0.21 0.48 0.05 0.00 3.08 93
Return on assets (percent) 0.34 0.21 0.47 0.05 -0.98 2.27 93
Equity ratio (percent) 4.96 4.06 3.90 0.40 0.81 24.04 93
Panel B: Savings banks
Assets (millions) 2,092 1,307 2,754 144 170 31,385 366
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 22.06 14.31 27.48 1.44 1.26 314.89 366
Fulfillment (percent) 102.65 101.36 6.08 0.32 84.22 133.01 366
Norm gross excess reserves (percent) 7.48 6.05 9.35 0.49 -35.88 40.76 366
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -81.53 -34.98 126.12 6.59 -1,187.84 25.81 366
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.36 0.32 0.22 0.01 0.00 1.48 366
Return on assets (percent) 0.22 0.21 0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.93 366
Equity ratio (percent) 4.12 4.01 0.79 0.04 2.46 8.08 366
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Panel C: Cooperatives
Assets (millions) 678 350 1,380 77 26 18,582 324
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 7.81 4.04 13.25 0.74 0.24 127.10 324
Fulfillment (percent) 102.94 101.49 8.15 0.45 74.05 159.71 324
Norm gross excess reserves (percent) 9.42 5.69 13.17 0.73 -48.10 70.77 324
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -31.90 -9.14 66.10 3.67 -585.01 44.27 324
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.45 0.39 0.46 0.03 0.00 7.22 324
Return on assets (percent) 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.01 -1.53 0.77 324
Equity ratio (percent) 4.94 4.85 1.11 0.06 1.67 11.63 324
Panel D: Foreign banks
Assets (millions) 2,256 1,135 2,586 564 31 8,009 21
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 17.09 8.94 18.91 4.13 0.02 62.31 21
Fulfillment (percent) 142.30 99.40 139.77 30.50 71.77 685.95 21
Norm gross excess reserves (percent) 103.94 12.67 278.41 60.75 -14.55 965.91 21
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -206.53 -24.12 663.91 144.88 -1950.78 968.01 21
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.26 0.09 0.60 0.13 0.00 2.18 21
Return on assets (percent) 0.28 0.15 0.53 0.12 -0.68 1.45 21
Equity ratio (percent) 7.86 5.02 9.19 2.01 1.09 34.09 21
Panel E: Landesbanks
Assets (millions) 96,918 73,940 68,435 19,755 12,539 228,659 12
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 351.98 266.25 265.26 76.57 21.09 854.93 12
Fulfillment (percent) 82.44 83.95 9.37 2.70 69.08 100.17 12
Norm gross excess reserves (percent) -11.86 -11.60 12.04 3.47 -38.78 6.88 12
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -217.10 -162.26 166.75 48.14 -596.13 -60.01 12
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.49 12
Return on assets (percent) 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.03 -0.15 0.24 12
Equity ratio (percent) 2.66 2.71 0.77 0.22 1.33 3.69 12
Panel F: Cooperative central banks
Assets (millions) 60,320 39,921 53,767 26,884 22,081 139,357 4
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 241.17 113.85 277.29 138.64 80.54 656.42 4
Fulfillment (percent) 99.00 98.22 10.29 5.15 87.33 112.22 4
Norm gross excess reserves (percent) 6.76 -0.11 18.00 9.00 -6.10 33.36 4
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -261.95 -157.97 268.94 134.47 -660.64 -71.21 4
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.46 4
Return on assets (percent) 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.44 4
Equity ratio (percent) 2.83 3.01 0.59 0.30 1.99 3.33 4
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Table 2
Bank characteristics: nonbidders
Descriptive statistics on bank characteristic variables for four types of banks as classified by the Deutsche Bundesbank: private
banks, savings banks, cooperatives, and branches of foreign banks. Nonbidders are all banks that did not participate in any main
refinancing operation during the sample period (June 27, 2000 to December 18, 2001). There is no Landesbank or cooperative central
bank nonbidder. All variables are as described in Table 1, but for nonbidders, there is no difference between gross and net excess
reserves as there never is a maturing repo.
Mean Median Standard Standard Minimum Maximum Observations
deviation error
Panel A: Private Banks
Assets (millions) 1,478 242 6,847 665 11 69,253 106
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 6.99 1.71 16.73 1.62 0.01 131.21 106
Fulfillment (percent) 169.61 108.13 279.13 27.11 26.84 2,073.32 106
Norm net excess reserves (percent) 210.83 24.93 808.20 78.50 -141.97 5,584.70 106
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.73 0.31 1.03 0.10 0.00 5.37 106
Return on assets (percent) 0.89 0.25 1.97 0.19 -4.61 12.51 106
Equity ratio (percent) 13.80 8.58 13.35 1.30 1.35 67.42 106
Panel b: Savings Banks
Assets (millions) 895 683 749 55 61 4,573 183
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 10.10 7.60 8.59 0.63 0.61 43.16 183
Fulfillment (percent) 102.67 101.32 6.24 0.46 88.77 135.04 183
Norm net excess reserves (percent) 8.30 6.21 12.77 0.94 -10.25 129.95 183
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.43 0.39 0.25 0.02 0.00 1.28 183
Return on assets (percent) 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.01 0.02 1.35 183
Equity ratio (percent) 4.31 4.19 0.88 0.07 2.28 8.02 183
Panel C: Cooperatives
Assets (millions) 234 148 302 8 12 4,220 1,275
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 2.86 1.84 3.58 0.10 0.01 40.26 1,275
Fulfillment (percent) 105.93 101.06 79.51 2.23 74.53 2,476.16 1,275
Norm net excess reserves (percent) 25.33 5.98 325.48 9.12 -233.86 9,219.97 1,275
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.01 -0.24 5.35 1,275
Return on assets (percent) 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.01 -4.52 3.97 1,275
Equity ratio (percent) 5.28 5.11 1.20 0.03 1.82 19.75 1,275
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Panel d: Foreign Banks
Assets (millions) 1,474 423 2,977 405 12 15,486 54
Reserve requirement (daily, millions) 9.61 2.06 27.29 3.71 0.00 191.84 54
Fulfillment (percent) 535.17 114.50 1,414.76 192.52 52.87 8,213.70 54
Norm net excess reserves (percent) 1,697.84 54.23 5,726.84 779.32 -15.89 35,075.25 54
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 0.20 0.06 0.27 0.04 0.00 0.91 54
Return on assets (percent) 0.88 0.27 1.65 0.22 0.03 6.72 54
Equity ratio (percent) 4.11 1.42 7.24 0.99 -1.05 35.42 54
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Table 3
Pricing and bidding statistics for individual banks by type
Descriptive statistics on bidding and performance variables for six types of banks as classified by the Deutsche Bundesbank: private
banks, savings banks, cooperatives, branches of foreign banks, Landesbanks, and cooperative central banks. The variables are defined
in Subsection 3.3. Means of each variable are calculated first for each bidding bank. The reported statistics are then calculated across
banks for each bank type. Sample period is from June 27, 2000 to December 18, 2001. bps: basis points.
Mean Standard Standard Minimum Maximum Observations
deviation error
Panel A: Private banks
Underpricing (bps) 1.24 1.75 0.19 -5.50 5.58 89
Relative underpricing (bps) 0.07 0.86 0.09 -3.47 1.65 89
Discount (bps) 3.04 2.07 0.21 -4.50 9.69 93
Relative discount (bps) 0.14 1.57 0.16 -4.89 5.92 93
Stop-out deviation (bps) 1.63 0.94 0.10 0.70 5.40 93
Award ratio (percent) 54.90 23.75 2.46 0.00 100.00 93
Award to total award (percent) 0.63 1.69 0.18 0.00 11.58 93
Bidding frequency (percent) 48.95 32.40 3.36 1.28 98.72 93
Number of bids 2.18 0.72 0.07 1.00 4.57 93
Panel B: Savings banks
Underpricing (bps) 1.66 1.90 0.10 -5.75 9.25 352
Relative underpricing (bps) -0.01 1.09 0.06 -7.71 3.46 352
Discount (bps) 3.32 2.81 0.15 -5.50 17.50 366
Relative discount (bps) -0.09 1.76 0.09 -8.14 12.10 366
Stop-out deviation (bps) 1.73 1.28 0.07 0.00 11.00 366
Award ratio (percent) 57.41 23.62 1.23 0.00 100.00 366
Award to total award (percent) 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.00 1.97 366
Bidding frequency (percent) 44.43 32.47 1.70 1.28 100.00 366
Number of bids 2.29 0.88 0.05 1.00 5.13 366
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Panel C: Cooperatives
Underpricing (bps) 0.78 2.55 0.15 -14.00 8.25 308
Relative underpricing (bps) -0.87 1.80 0.10 -14.13 3.88 308
Discount (bps) 3.47 4.09 0.23 -14.00 31.25 324
Relative discount (bps) -0.18 2.91 0.16 -14.24 21.37 324
Stop-out deviation (bps) 2.80 2.20 0.12 0.00 21.00 324
Award ratio (bps) 58.97 26.29 1.46 0.00 100.00 324
Award to total award (percent) 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.77 324
Bidding frequency (percent) 27.51 25.41 1.41 1.28 100.00 324
Number of bids 2.05 1.09 0.06 1.00 9.00 324
Panel D: Foreign banks
Underpricing (bps) 0.69 1.94 0.44 -4.75 3.29 19
Relative underpricing (bps) -0.18 1.42 0.33 -5.71 1.02 19
Discount (bps) 2.84 4.24 0.93 -4.75 13.25 21
Relative discount (bps) -0.15 2.35 0.51 -7.45 4.64 21
Stopout deviation (bps) 1.94 1.57 0.34 0.40 7.00 21
Award ratio (percent) 58.34 28.36 6.19 0.00 100.00 21
Award to total award (percent) 0.17 0.32 0.07 0.00 1.15 21
Bidding frequency (percent) 34.68 27.90 6.09 1.28 97.44 21
Number of bids 1.87 0.84 0.18 1.00 4.22 21
Panel E: Landesbanks
Underpricing (bps) 1.48 1.14 0.33 -0.54 3.87 12
Relative underpricing (bps) 0.53 0.36 0.10 0.02 1.19 12
Discount (bps) 2.83 1.31 0.38 1.21 5.61 12
Relative discount (bps) 0.50 0.77 0.22 -0.51 2.31 12
Stopout deviation (bps) 1.04 0.22 0.06 0.70 1.46 12
Award ratio (percent) 48.54 14.42 4.16 27.15 73.42 12
Award to total award (percent) 1.68 1.39 0.40 0.24 4.58 12
Bidding frequency (percent) 80.45 19.41 5.60 29.49 100.00 12
Number of bids 2.42 0.40 0.12 1.84 3.15 12
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Panel F: Cooperative central banks
Underpricing (bps) 2.82 1.60 0.80 1.53 5.16 4
Relative underpricing (bps) 0.51 0.57 0.29 -0.15 1.24 4
Discount (bps) 4.27 2.23 1.12 2.38 7.50 4
Relative discount (bps) 0.45 0.61 0.30 -0.11 1.28 4
Stopout deviation (bps) 1.17 0.31 0.15 0.83 1.55 4
Award ratio (percent) 42.34 16.93 8.46 18.34 56.57 4
Award to total award (percent) 1.45 0.90 0.45 0.53 2.64 4
Bidding frequency (percent) 49.36 31.97 15.98 3.85 75.64 4
Number of bids 3.51 1.49 0.74 2.43 5.67 4
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Table 4
Cross-sectional regressions of pricing and bidding variables on bank characteristics
Each column represents a separate regression. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity by using the Huber-White estimate
of variance. t-statistics are in brackets. a, b, and c denote significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Sample
period is from June 27, 2000 to December 18, 2001. bps: basis points.
Underpricing Relative Discount Relative Stop-out Award
underpricing discount deviation ratio
(bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (percent)
Constant 0.479 -1.477a 6.064a 1.885b 4.642a 43.016a
(0.63) (-3.05) (5.52) (2.38) (8.58) (4.78)
ln(assets) [ln(mln)] 0.149b 0.186a -0.201c -0.125c -0.320a 0.381
(2.00) (3.84) (-1.93) (-1.66) (-6.13) (0.46)
Norm net excess reserves (percent) 4.4E-04 -1.7E-04b 0.002a 0.001b 0.001a -0.015b
(1.43) (-2.02) (2.71) (2.09) (3.34) (-2.39)
Small x nex (percent) 1.8E-05 -3.0E-05 1.8E-05 -2.4E-05 6.0E-05b 4.6E-05
(0.32) (-0.71) (0.23) (-0.43) (2.44) (0.10)
Write-offs and provisions (percent) 1.841 2.250 39.643 23.692 -8.038 -306.382
(0.07) (0.16) (1.31) (1.49) (-0.88) (-1.32)
Return on assets (percent) -0.473 27.874 -27.050 -17.738 -25.988 -123.625
(-0.01) (1.49) (-0.36) (-0.30) (-0.56) (-0.35)
Equity ratio (percent) -0.067c -0.034 -0.178a -0.114a 0.001 1.237b
(-1.72) (-1.42) (-2.63) (-2.71) (0.03) (2.45)
Savings bank 0.411c 0.169 -0.498 -0.604a -0.456a 6.742b
(1.68) (1.33) (-1.60) (-2.60) (-3.00) (2.10)
Cooperative bank -0.240 -0.395b -0.608 -0.830a 0.153 8.770b
(-0.76) (-2.24) (-1.44) (-2.65) (0.73) (2.27)
Foreign bank -0.181 0.055 -0.240 -0.391 -0.275 5.361
(-0.37) (0.27) (-0.21) (-0.68) (-0.69) (0.66)
Landesbank -0.405 -0.056 -0.157 0.428 0.203 -4.651
(-1.02) (-0.32) (-0.31) (1.24) (1.08) (-0.92)
Cooperative central bank 1.043 -0.026 1.284 0.357 0.251 -11.095
(1.38) (-0.08) (1.31) (1.15) (0.80) (-1.51)
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.106 0.019 0.053 0.143 0.023
Observations 777 777 812 812 812 812
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Table 5
Market condition and interaction variables
Listed are descriptive statistics of market condition and interaction explanatory variables. Imbalance is the standard deviation of
the normalized net excess reserves across all banks before a given auction. Imbalance×nex and imbalance×ln(assets) are interaction
variables for which imbalance is multiplied by the normalized net excess reserves and log of assets, respectively, for each bidder in a
given auction. (Nex denotes normalized net excess reserves.) Size ratio is the ratio of the expected auction size in auction j and the
realized auction size in auction j − 2. Expected auction size is the liquidity neutral amount, which is computed from the liquidity
figures announced by the European Central Bank the afternoon on the day prior to the auction. Swap spread is the difference between
the two-week Eonia swap rate and the minimum bid rate at 9:15 a.m. on the auction day. Volatility of swap rate is the conditional
volatility of the two week Eonia swap rate on auction days (see footnote 22). Sample period is from June 27, 2000 to December 18,
2001.
Mean Median Standard Standard Minimum Maximum Observations
deviation error
Imbalance (percent) 1,144 400 3,331 382 86 26,997 76
Imbalance × nex (percent × percent) -208,065 -42,118 2,770,774 18,022 -9.79E+07 3.67E+08 23,635
Imbalance × ln(assets) [percent × ln(mln)] 7,543 2,945 21,128 137 282 339,127 23,673
Size ratio (100%) 1.24 0.98 1.75 0.20 0.20 15.80 76
Expected auction size (billions) 84.26 83.00 28.83 3.26 5 177 78
Swap spread (basis points) 5.91 4.25 8.66 0.98 -9.00 48.25 78
Volatility of swap rate (basis points) 5.32 5.78 1.33 0.15 0.19 9.30 78
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Table 6
Panel regressions of pricing and bidding variables on market conditions and bank characteristics
Each column represents a separate regression, all run with maintenance period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on each
auction and adjusted for heteroskedasticity by using the Huber-White estimate of variance. t-statistics are in brackets. a, b, and
c denote significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Nex denotes normalized net excess reserves. Control
variables whose coefficients are not reported are: swap spread, negative swap spread, and the conditional volatility of the Eonia swap.
Sample period is from June 27, 2000 to December 18, 2001. bps: basis points.
Underpricing Relative Discount Relative Stop-out Award
underpricing discount deviation ratio
(bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (percent)
Constant -0.292 -1.259a 1.774 -1.021c 1.110b 23.654b
(-0.28) (-4.51) (1.57) (-1.91) (2.45) (2.56)
ln(assets) [ln(mln)] 0.174a 0.162a 0.029 0.017 -0.191a -0.241
(10.34) (9.12) (0.71) (0.40) (-7.61) (-0.73)
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -3.8E-05 1.9E-06 2.3E-04a 2.3E-04a 8.9E-05b -0.006a
(-0.85) (0.06) (3.65) (4.19) (2.59) (-6.70)
Small × nex (percent) 1.9E-05a 1.8E-05a 2.2E-05a 2.2E-05a -7.9E-06c -2.8E-05
(3.41) (3.16) (2.82) (2.82) (-1.82) (-0.34)
Write-offs and provisions (percent) -17.258a -16.817a -6.611 -6.642 16.859a 227.456a
(-3.44) (-3.80) (-0.94) (-0.96) (3.78) (3.22)
Return on assets (percent) 6.228 8.335b 17.402a 17.625a 4.487 -59.745
(1.62) (2.29) (2.75) (2.83) (1.29) (-0.84)
Equity ratio (percent) 0.025a 0.020a -0.014 -0.020 -0.021a 0.590a
(3.63) (2.82) (-1.15) (-1.54) (-2.76) (3.91)
Imbalance (percent) -9.8E-06a -5.6E-06a -1.5E-05a -9.4E-06a 4.7E-06a 1.3E-04a
(-6.28) (-6.40) (-6.85) (-5.57) (3.83) (3.03)
Imbalance × nex (percent × percent) 7.3E-10a 5.4E-10a -3.9E-10 -4.4E-10c -8.2E-10a 1.3E-08a
(3.62) (4.09) (-1.39) (-1.81) (-5.31) (2.91)
Imbalance × ln(assets) [percent × ln(mln)] 4.2E-07a 5.1E-07a -9.5E-07a 1.0E-06a -2.0E-07 -6.7E-08b
(3.22) (4.43) (4.06) (4.76) (-1.33) (-2.60)
Size ratio (100%) 0.098b -0.021b 0.069 0.015 -0.039b -0.026
(2.23) (-2.32) (1.48) (0.92) (-2.03) (-0.08)
Exp. auction size (billions) 0.022a -0.001 0.016b 0.004 0.004 0.253a
(3.95) (-0.44) (2.38) (1.12) (1.43) (3.67)
Savings bank 0.034 0.019 -0.458a -0.463a -0.229a 9.070a
(0.54) (0.34) (-4.29) (-4.38) (-3.02) (8.17)
Cooperative bank -0.415a -0.407a -0.477a -0.460a 0.167a 6.541a
(-7.08) (-7.68) (-5.35) (-5.59) (3.24) (5.58)
Foreign bank -0.141 -0.121 -0.721a -0.693a -0.061 13.537a
(-1.41) (-1.44) (-5.46) (-5.43) (-0.64) (6.23)
Landesbank -0.012 -0.071 0.189 0.220 0.249a -4.289a
(-0.19) (-1.27) (1.13) (1.29) (3.48) (-2.86)
Cooperative central bank -0.153 -0.141 0.028 0.047 0.217b -4.989c
(-1.30) (-1.47) (0.16) (0.28) (2.55) (-1.77)
Adjusted R2 0.605 0.067 0.571 0.044 0.227 0.226
Observations 19,088 19,088 23,461 23,461 23,461 23,461
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Table 7
Heckman sample selection panel regressions of pricing and bidding variables on market conditions and bank characteristics
Each column represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered on each auction and adjusted for heteroskedasticity by
using the Huber-White estimate of variance. t-statistics are in brackets. a, b, and c denote significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Nex denotes normalized net excess reserves. The selection equation (Panel b) is run on the full sample of
bidding and nonbidding banks. Control variables whose coefficients are not reported are: swap spread, negative swap spread, and the
conditional volatility of the Eonia swap. Sample period is from June 27, 2000 to December 18, 2001. In Panel c standard errors are in
italics. bps: basis points.
Underpricing Relative Discount Relative Stop-out Award
underpricing discount deviation ratio
(bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (percent)
Panel A: Bidding and Performance
Constant -1.530 -1.575a 0.216 -1.461b 1.220b 51.053a
(-1.25) (-5.08) (0.16) (-2.35) (2.29) (3.84)
ln(assets) [ln(mln)] 0.131a 0.180a 0.055 0.089b -0.167a -1.691a
(4.67) (9.78) (1.03) (2.03) (-6.95) (-4.20)
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -3.1E-05 -2.6E-05 1.4E-04b 1.4E-04a 4.0E-05 -0.003a
(-0.77) (-1.01) (2.53) (2.98) (1.57) (-4.63)
Small × nex (percent) 1.8E-05a 1.6E-05a 1.5E-05c 1.3E-05c -1.1E-05b 1.3E-04
(2.58) (2.75) (1.79) (1.77) (-2.48) (1.55)
Write-offs and provisions (percent) -36.261a -13.612a -13.088 1.826 16.329b 20.880
(-3.40) (-3.07) (-1.11) (0.22) (2.37) (0.17)
Return on assets (percent) 7.373 8.399b 18.599a 17.700a 4.680 -64.452
(1.63) (2.28) (2.76) (2.71) (1.37) (-0.91)
Equity ratio (percent) 0.011 0.022a -0.028b -0.016 -0.020a 0.581a
(1.15) (3.23) (-2.38) (-1.27) (-2.65) (4.00)
Imbalance (percent) -1.0E-05a -5.1E-06a -1.3E-05a 8.0E-06a 4.3E-06a 6.1E-05b
(-4.54) (-5.72) (-5.03) (-4.42) (3.27) (2.55)
Imbalance × nex (percent × percent) 7.3E-10a 6.3E-10a -1.1E-10 -1.2E-10 -6.4E-10a 5.3E-09
(3.60) (5.83) (-0.41) (-0.61) (-5.32) (1.32)
Imbalance × ln(assets) [percent × ln(mln)] 5.5E-07a 4.9E-07a 9.6E-07a 9.4E-07a -2.4E-07c -5.2E-06b
(4.02) (4.60) (3.83) (4.41) (-1.69) (-2.24)
Size ratio (100%) 0.104a -0.008 0.094a 0.004 -0.031a -0.498b
(4.54) (-1.47) (3.19) (0.21) (-2.62) (-2.08)
Expected auction size (billions) 0.030a -0.001 0.018b 0.003 0.006c 0.332a
(3.63) (-0.45) (2.02) (1.01) (1.82) (3.85)
Savings bank 0.021 0.051 -0.375a -0.354a -0.177b 6.717a
(0.33) (0.93) (-3.15) (-3.30) (-2.33) (5.60)
Cooperative bank -0.365a -0.408a -0.465a -0.480a 0.167a 6.731a
(-5.67) (-7.59) (-4.75) (-5.39) (2.97) (5.39)
Foreign bank -0.144 -0.088 -0.577a -0.587a -0.039 11.092a
(-1.20) (-1.05) (-4.06) (-4.72) (-0.39) (5.21)
Landesbank -0.019 -0.068 0.166 0.228 0.248a -4.392a
(-0.27) (-1.19) (1.05) (1.37) (3.48) (-2.97)
Cooperative central bank -0.021 -0.183b 0.096 -0.077 0.194b -3.370
(-0.14) (-1.96) (0.52) (-0.47) (2.23) (-1.20)
N uncensored 19,088 19,088 23,461 23,461 23,461 23,461
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Panel B: Selection
Constant -3.779a -3.778a -3.525a -3.529a -3.525a -3.528a
(-28.62) (-28.44) (-31.68) (-31.20) (-31.81) (-31.44)
ln(assets) [ln(mln)] 0.244a 0.244a 0.264a 0.264a 0.265a 0.263a
(25.82) (25.77) (28.53) (28.30) (28.64) (28.49)
Norm net excess reserves (percent) -1.4E-06 -1.4E-06 -8.6E-07 -8.5E-07 -8.6E-07 -8.9E-07
(-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.13)
Small × nex (percent) -1.6E-05a -1.6E-05a -1.8E-05a -1.8E-05a -1.7E-05a -1.8E-05a
(-6.17) (-6.14) (-6.68) (-6.65) (-6.67) (-6.64)
Write-offs and provisions (percent) -3.767a -3.733a -3.125a -3.006a -3.160a -2.957a
(-2.79) (-2.79) (-2.88) (-2.79) (-2.89) (-2.74)
Return on assets (percent) -8.221a -8.219a -7.762a -7.748a -7.780a -7.708a
(-6.24) (-6.22) (-6.94) (-6.94) (-7.01) (-6.87)
Equity ratio (percent) 0.006a 0.006a 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(2.68) (2.67) (1.45) (1.44) (1.47) (1.47)
Imbalance (percent) 1.6E-06a 1.6E-06a 2.0E-06a 2.0E-06a 2.0E-06a 1.9E-06a
(2.93) (2.92) (3.24) (3.25) (3.22) (3.28)
Imbalance × nex (percent × percent) 9.6E-11 9.7E-11 8.7E-11 8.7E-11 8.6E-11 9.1E-11
(0.55) (0.56) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.51)
Imbalance × ln(assets) [percent × ln(mln)] -6.0E-08 -5.9E-08 -1.5E-07c -1.4E-07c -1.5E-07c -1.4E-07c
(-0.87) (-0.85) (-1.79) (-1.77) (-1.80) (-1.77)
Size ratio (100%) 0.018a 0.018a 0.019a 0.020a 0.019a 0.019a
(5.89) (5.92) (6.80) (6.82) (6.74) (6.78)
Expected auction size (billions) 0.002a 0.002a -7.6E-05 -3.0E-05 -7.4E-05 -2.9E-05
(2.88) (2.86) (-0.10) (-0.04) (-0.09) (-0.04)
Savings bank 0.207a 0.208a 0.166a 0.166a 0.165a 0.166a
(7.09) (7.09) (6.92) (6.89) (6.84) (6.91)
Cooperative bank -0.091a -0.091a -0.117a -0.117a -0.117a -0.117a
(-3.24) (-3.24) (-4.88) (-4.87) (-4.85) (-4.84)
Foreign bank 0.062 0.062 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.020
(1.14) (1.16) (-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.39)
Landesbank 0.062 0.063 0.156b 0.153c 0.156c 0.143c
(0.77) (0.78) (1.96) (1.93) (1.95) (1.82)
Cooperative central bank -0.165 -0.164 -0.085 -0.087 -0.087 -0.094
(-1.21) (-1.20) (-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.74)
Maturing repo indicator 2.431a 2.431a 2.352a 2.351a 2.351a 2.351a
(58.41) (58.36) (60.20) (60.01) (60.28) (59.55)
Last auction 2.439a 2.491a 1.807b 1.940b 1.722b 1.999a
(2.86) (2.90) (2.23) (2.41) (2.17) (2.66)
Observations 164,746 164,746 169,119 169,119 169,119 169,119
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Panel C: Parameters
Log pseudolikelihood -69721 -63710 -93279 -89687 -79036 -149881
Prob>chi2 0.372 0.021 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.000
rho -0.034 0.049b 0.083b 0.129b 0.071b -0.219b
0.038 0.021 0.037 0.030 0.023 0.031
sigma 2.352b 1.717b 3.235b 2.784b 1.762b 36.490b
0.138 0.139 0.321 0.302 0.155 0.965
lambda -0.080 0.085b 0.268b 0.360b 0.125b -7.975b
0.091 0.037 0.110 0.066 0.043 1.108
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Appendix
The structure of the German banking sector
The German banking system is traditionally a system of universal banking and has a
three-pillar structure. These are (with each pillar’s aggregate balance sheet as a percentage
of the entire banking sector in parentheses as of 2000): (1) private domestic commercial
banks (40%); (2) public banks, i.e., savings banks (16%) and their regional head institu-
tions, the Landesbanks (20%), which are jointly owned by the respective state and the
regional association of savings banks; and (3) credit cooperatives (9%) and the coopera-
tive central banks (3%), which are primarily owned by the regional credit cooperatives.
Branches of foreign banks operating in Germany made up 2% of total assets.29
This three pillar structure affects the way in which liquidity is reallocated in the banking
sector. The public banks as well as the cooperative banking sector form a relatively
closed giro system. On balance, the second-tier institutions (the savings banks and the
credit cooperatives) typically achieve a significant liquidity surplus due to their retail
business structure. Within the giro systems, they pass this excess liquidity onto the
respective (regional) head institution. Consequently, on average in the years 2000 and 2001
savings banks held almost 75% of their interbank overnight deposits with their respective
Landesbank. At the same time, only slightly more than 50% of savings banks’ overnight
borrowing was obtained from the regional Landesbank. Similarly, credit cooperatives
granted more than 90% of their overnight interbank loans to one of the cooperative central
banks, while they received only around 30% of their overnight interbank borrowing from
the cooperative central banks. Conversely, the cooperative central banks obtained around
60% of the daily interbank liabilities from credit cooperatives, while Landesbanks received
less than 30% of their overnight interbank loans from the regional savings banks. Instead,
they obtained the majority of their short-term interbank funds from foreign banks.30 Thus,
the savings and cooperative banks could have less of a need to participate directly in the
market for reserves than private banks.
29In addition, special purpose banks (such as the Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau) and buildings societies
(Bausparkassen) account for 7% and 2% of the banking sector, respectively. For a more detailed description
of the German banking sector, see, for example, Hackethal (2004).
30For a broader discussion of the interbank linkages in the German banking sector in general and within
the three pillars in particular, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2000) and Upper and Worms (2004).
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